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1 December 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

REFERENCE: OPC Paper Attached

This appears to us to be a very good paper, but we have a number of questions which might be considered in reviewing it.

1. Would it be desirable to include a forthright statement that OPC engages in no activities which have not been approved by State and Defense?
2. With respect to Section II, "Definition of GCI Activities," would it be desirable to state that as far as we know the assignment of these responsibilities to OPC is not compromised or hindered by any comparable assignments elsewhere?
3. Do we want to call attention to the lack of policy guidance for covert economic warfare (Pg. 4, Para. 3)? This situation has changed since the PSB was created, but has the problem been solved?
4. Is there a problem with respect to the jurisdiction of the PSB over OPC activities under the headings of "Evacuation," "Escape and Evasion" and "Counter Sabotage"?
5. Does Para. 7, Pg. 5, mean that OPC is solely responsible for escape and evasion nets to be used by the Military in the event of war?
6. Para. 6, Pg. 8 states that the magnitude paper is attached as a tab. Is this in accordance with your concept of the whole CIA report?
7. On Page 9, Para. 3b. is stated that NSC 10/5 "established an agency." Is this a fact?
8. It seems to me very important that we avoid any suggestion of extravagant claims with respect to either

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the importance, success or effectiveness to date of OPC operations. This applies particularly to the section on "Accomplishments." Would it be helpful on Page 11 to insert a note of modesty or disclaimer? In addition, perhaps we should be specific throughout Section II and point out where appropriate the limited nature of the success or effectiveness of our operations.

9. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to add at an appropriate point in the text a paragraph that would place covert operations in their proper perspective vis-a-vis national policy. It might be summarized somewhat like this: OPC's operations, apart from building its apparatus, are directed toward three major objectives: (a) countering existing Communist influence and threats in key countries, (b) preparing for covert activities necessary in the event of general war, and (c) supporting positive U.S. policies to strengthen the unity of the West and to prevent Communist threats from developing in new areas. Because of the limited capabilities of OPC in its initial stages and because of the urgent priority of the first two objectives, very little has been done to date that wasn't purely defensive vis-a-vis the Soviets. If this three-way breakdown is useful, it might suggest some modifications in the rest of the paper to make clear the relative importance given to each objective.

10. With respect to "Political Warfare Under a Military Shield" (Problem 9, Pg. 28), this is an over-all national problem that may impose a limitation on OPC's effectiveness but is part of their environment about which they can do nothing. It should be treated elsewhere in the paper.

11. The same is true about the "Public Relations" problem (Pg. 29, Para 10). This is more than public relations--it is a national policy decision affecting not only the East-West cold war but the neutrals and the probability and timing of a hot war.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Assistant Director  
Intelligence Coordination


Attached (CPC Paper)

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
*Milliken*

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1 December 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR:



SUBJECT: ORR Report (Attached)

1. Attached is the ORR report in its revision after our discussions between ORR and OIC. It seems to us that this is a very good report. We have, on the carbon copy, made some notations which we think should be taken into account in any future revision.

2. Here are some additional suggestions:

a. It may be desirable to take the third paragraph of the Summary out of this context and discuss it in the over-all introductory statement to the section. We are planning to write a new draft of that and will consider it then.

b. It is our feeling that at the appropriate place in the paper there needs to be defined the conception of the whole of Government economic intelligence and where other agencies and ORR fit. This is believed necessary because although we promise we are doing a lot of coordinating and imply that no one is duplicating anyone else the reader is not satisfied entirely. I have in mind that one could point out that State is still providing economic intelligence in respect of trends throughout the world, that Air, Army and Navy are doing departmental economic intelligence to support specific departmental needs and that ORR in its research production (as opposed to coordination) is not duplicating these since it is operating in research areas in which the community agrees it ought to be.

c. There probably should be a paragraph which gives some notation of the fields (not listing divisions as such) which make up ORR's basic research program. This might include mention of actual or contemplated TO strength.

3. Would it not be better to treat all of Section III, Part 4, by subject rather than by office:

- a. Collection and Dissemination;
- b. Economic Intelligence (rather than ORR);
- c. Scientific Intelligence (rather than OSI);

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- d. Current intelligence (rather than OCI); and
- e. Other production such as NIS and geographic.

This does not mean that these papers that have been written would be discarded or even materially altered, but it would mean that the reader would get a functional impression rather than an organizational one in respect to production. Incidentally the whole of Part 4 should be considered "production" rather than "processing."

4. We have some reservations on ORR's Problem 2 both as to what is said and how it is said, and want to have a chance to discuss it further at the appropriate time.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Assistant Director  
Intelligence Coordination

Attached (ORR Report)

cc Mr. Millikan

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C O P Y

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Nov 29 1951

THE OFFICE OF COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION (OCD)

Summary

Raw and finished intelligence materials coming into and going out from CIA are handled centrally. They are catalogued, indexed, cross-referenced, and filed; while special Registers handle biographic, industrial, and photographic data separately. Modern machine methods are used in servicing researchers' needs for reference facilities.

These facilities are available to other U.S. intelligence agencies, and in fact are utilized by them. Liaison is maintained with the other agencies in order to facilitate intercourse among researchers with common interests.

1. The Office of Collection & Dissemination, OCD, serves as the chief point of entry and the chief point of departure for intelligence documents flowing into and out of the Agency, and this Office thus performs the first steps in the processing of intelligence. OCD's prime job is to control and organize the 30,000 different reports and studies received each month, getting them to the people who need them, and cataloguing and cross-referencing them for future use. The OCD units engaged on this job are the CIA Library, four specialized Registers which are described below, and a Machine Division which provides machine support for the whole. Certain interagency liaison operations are inseparable from the control of intelligence documents, and these are performed by a Liaison Division.

## 2. CIA LIBRARY

The federal government spends large sums, and its servants risk their lives, to collect the raw materials of intelligence in far corners of the world. The costs and the hazards are justified only to the extent that the fruits of the undertaking - in the form of cables and reports from the Foreign Service, the Defense agencies, and CIA's own overseas stations - are put to the best possible use. The first essential step is to ensure that each report is indexed and cross-referenced in the fullest detail, in order that its substance may be drawn upon whenever the need arises. Even those reports which seem of scant value today may become vitally important, some months hence, in the solving of problems which cannot now be foreseen.

The CIA Library performs this initial and essential step in the processing of intelligence, and it must index and cross-reference some 20,000 to 30,000 reports each month in sufficient detail to meet all conceivable intelligence needs. This is an undertaking of great magnitude and complexity, and it is one which no intelligence agency has ever before attempted. It has involved the development of unique machine equipment, known as Intellofax, which is able on very short notice to provide lists of all available intelligence documents bearing upon any particular subject in any particular area of the world. Though developed to meet the needs of CIA's own research people, the Intellofax System

provides so unique a service that the CIA Library is increasingly called upon to employ it in meeting the needs of other agencies. In effect, therefore, the System is now providing an urgently needed service of common concern. In October of 1951 it supplied 262 bibliographies for CIA itself, 60 for the Department of State and the Defense agencies, and 21 for other agencies. These listed the titles, and in some cases gave abstracts, of 65,589 intelligence documents.

### 3. SPECIALIZED REFERENCE FACILITIES

Certain types of intelligence research require more detailed or more specialized reference services than those which could reasonably be demanded of a library. These are provided, in part, by the several Registers of OCD. Each of them has a specific mission to perform, each has developed specialized techniques for handling its own job, and each obtains machine support and technical assistance from the Machine Division. Each gives service not only to the several Offices and Staffs of CIA, but also to all IAC agencies. The Biographic Register provides "Who's Who" service on foreign scientists and technicians, in accordance with NS-TP No. 8 which directed CIA to perform this mission as a service of common concern for all agencies. This Register, in addition, provides the more generalized biographic services which are required by the research and operational staffs of CIA itself. The Industrial Register performs a service which is analogous to

that of the Biographic Register, but the dossiers in its file cabinets represent foreign industrial plants and factories rather than individual personalities. It sorts out all the incoming scraps of information on foreign industrial plants, assigns each item to the appropriate dossier, and maintains a machine index to all the data in its files. This enables it to prepare listings on short notice of all factories in any given area, or of all plants producing particular commodities, or any desired combination of these two types of lists. The Graphics Register performs a service of common concern in compiling and indexing photographs and motion picture films of intelligence value. CIA became responsible for this undertaking by agreement with the State Department in 1947, when State turned over to CIA the photograph library which it had inherited from the Office of Strategic Services. The Special Register indexes certain current intelligence materials which may not be handled by the CIA Library.

#### 4. LIAISON

The Liaison Division of OCU reads all incoming cables and reports, and sends copies of each to the Offices and Staffs which require them for intelligence research or in support of operations. Its decisions as to who should get what are based on detailed statements of requirements received from all units. Requests for specific information which is not available are handled by a small staff of liaison officers, who discuss them



with all government agencies who might be able to produce the data. In the event of failure, these requests are written up as collection directives and transmitted to OSO or Contact Division of CIA, or to that one of the other agencies which appears most likely to be able to obtain the information by field collection methods.

#### 5. COORDINATION

OCD is responsible, as are all Offices of the Agency, for maintaining effective coordination with all units of CIA and with the other intelligence agencies. Since OCD is primarily a service unit, its chief concern is to ensure that its facilities are operated in such a way as to satisfy, as nearly as possible, the needs of the other offices and agencies. Through appropriate means of coordination, it must see to it (a) that comparable facilities in other agencies designed to meet their own needs do not overlap those developed in OCD without good reason, (b) that those services which can best be performed centrally are so performed, and (c) that there is an effective and continuing interchange of ideas on how best to improve these facilities and services.

#### 6. PROBLEMS

Intelligence research on Soviet and Satellite developments becomes steadily more intensified, and this leads to ever-increasing demands from the researchers for both broader and more detailed support by reference facilities. This support cannot be provided

save by specialists who are now hard to find, and by adequate clerical help. To locate and hire the needed hands, and to find the space for them and their files and equipment, is a major problem. It is exceedingly difficult, also, to determine just which services should be given highest priority within the current limitations on space and manpower. Assistance in making this decision is now being received from panels of consultants representing the consumer offices, who meet together and thrash out the most urgent problems of the CIA Library and Registers. By use of this device, OCD is enabled to assign priorities with some assurance that they are in accord with the customers' needs.

The Intellofax System developed for general reference purposes is working well, but its ultimate potentialities will not be realized until it is able to transmit bibliographies direct to outlying buildings of CIA and to the other intelligence agencies. This will require development of a scrambler device so that classified materials may safely be transmitted.